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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CORPORATIONS
Milton M Harrison*
Since 1968, with the passage of Louisiana Act 105 which amended
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of Title 12 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, there has
been doubt concerning the status of the so-called de facto-corporation and
estoppel-to-deny-corporate-existence rules. Section 25B of the act, pro-
vides that "[t]he certification of incorporation shall be conclusive evidence
of the fact that the corporation has been duly incorporated. ... " It should
be noted, however, that the Louisiana legislation does not go further, as
does the Model Business Corporation Act, to provide that "[a]ll persons
who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do shall be jointly
and severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a result
thereof.' '2 The comments following section 26 of the Louisiana statute
indicate that the statute was drafted to permit the full application of the de
facto-corporation and estoppel-to-deny doctrines, but the courts have not
heretofore applied either doctrine under the new statute.
In North American Contracting Corporation v. Gibson,3 two prospec-
tive incorporators entered into a contract to furnish carpentry labor on a
construction job. The contract was entered into in the name of the corpora-
tion over a month before incorporation. The individuals who signed for the
not yet formed corporation were held liable for a breach of the contract as
agents for a nonexistent principal4 and the corporation was held liable
because it had received partial payments prior to the breach and was
"estopped to deny its corporate existence at the time the contract was
entered into. 5
The case is of interest because it is the first time a court has indicated
that the estoppel-to-deny-corporate-existence doctrine is to be applied in
accordance with the comment of the draftsmen. 6
Two partners incorporated their drug business. Three hundred shares
of stock were issued to one partner, defendant in Dardeau v. Fontenot.'
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 12:25 (1950).
2. A.B.A. - A.L.I. MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT § 139 (1960).
3. 327 So. 2d 444 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
4. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3010, 3012 and 3013.
5. 327 So. 2d at 451.
6. A forthcoming comment will treat the de facto and estoppel-to-deny doc-
trines in greater detail.
7. 326 So. 2d 521 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 37
1977] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1975-1976 391
Defendant endorsed one-half of the share certificates to his partner, plain-
tiff's deceased husband. All share certificates were delivered to the attorney
who represented the parties in the formation of the corporation. In answer to
the suit by the widow and children of the deceased shareholder who asserted
their ownership of one-half of the shares, the defendant argued that the
endorsement by him to the deceased did not effect transfer of ownership
because the share certificates were not delivered to the deceased. The court
held that delivery of the certificate is not essential if ownership is established
otherwise as it was in this case. Although the Uniform Stock Transfer Act8
requires delivery, the court held that the statute is not intended to provide the
exclusive means for evidence of ownership of stock. The decision here is
consistent with a prior holding that the certificate is only evidence of
ownership of stock as between the parties and that stock ownership may pass
even if delivery has not occurred. 9
The court of appeal distinguished its earlier decision in Griffith v.
Hasha.° In Griffith the court found no ownership of stock by claimant
because he had not advanced the funds which were a condition to his
acquiring ownership of stock. Therefore, it was not the lack of delivery of
certificates which was controlling but the non-performance of a condition
required to give rise to his right to stock in the corporation.
The courts were confronted with two cases involving the disregard of
corporateness, piercing the corporate veil, or treating a corporation as the
alter ego of the shareholders. In Evergreen Plantation, Inc. v. Zunamon, a
vendor of timber sued to invalidate the sale because of lesion beyond
moiety. The vendee had been a corporation, since dissolved, whose assets
had been transferred to a partnership formed by the owners of 41% of the
stock of the former corporation. The present owner of the contract to cut the
timber in question is the defendant, who admittedly is the nominee of the
partnership which acquired the assets of the corporation. In denying that the
partnership was the alter ego of the dissolved corporation, the court noted
that the partners had been minority shareholders of the predecessor corpora-
tions, that the price paid by the partnership for the assets of the corporation
was fair, and that the partners had not instigated or participated in the
dissolution of the corporation for the purpose of transferring the timber into
the hands of a third party purchaser to defeat the action for lesion. 12
8. LA. R.S. 12:624 (1958).
9. Finn v. Ponsaa, 308 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
10. 315 So. 2d 778 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
11. 319 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
12. Id. at 548. The court found that the evidence did not support the right to
rescission for lesion beyond moiety.
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In Ogaard v. Wiley, 1 the court found a milling corporation to be the
alter ego of a farming corporation and held the latter liable for damages
resulting from the negligence of an employee of the milling corporation, on
the basis of respondeat superior. The factual bases for the court's finding
were that the milling corporation had only $1000 of capital; it was not
expected to make a profit; the two corporations had the same post office
box; the same individuals controlled and managed both corporations; and
money borrowed by one corporation was used by the other. The evidence in
this case justifies the finding and does not do violence to the general rule that
corporateness will not be disregarded except in extreme cases.
Closely related to the alter ego doctrine in the two cases discussed
above is the disregard of the partnership entity in Drenning v. Kuebel, Inc. 4
The owner of one-fourth of the stock of a corporation sought to set aside a
sale of the corporation's primary asset by the liquidator. The liquidator, a
cousin of the owners of 75% of the stock, sold the assets of the corporation
to a partnership composed of the 75% owners of the corporation, at
substantially below its market value. In annulling and setting aside the sale
as to the plaintiff's interest, the court did not consider the partnership, an
entity separate from the partners, as a third-party purchaser and protected by
the rule of McDuffie v. Walker. " The court held the liquidator to the
fiduciary obligation and the burden of proving good faith and fair value, as
set forth in Noe v. Roussel. 16
The Courtyard Curio Shoppe, Inc. operated its business under the trade
name of Courtyard Curio Shoppe. 17 The corporation was owned by husband
and wife. Plaintiff sold goods to the shop through the wife, who did not
indicate that she was acting for a corporation. The owners were held
personally liable under the well established rule than an agent acting on
behalf of a corporation has the burden of proving that he disclosed his status
as agent and the identity of the principal. Thus, the wife as the agent should
be held personally liable. But as Judge Redmann points out in a dissent,
there is no basis for holding the husband personally liable because he was
not the agent who bought from the plaintiff.
13. 325 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
14. 327 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
15. 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
16. 310 So. 2d 806 (La. 1975).
17. Lagniappe of New Orleans, Ltd. v. Denmark, 330 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1976).
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